Emergence of Good Conduct, Scaling and Zipf Laws in Human Behavioral Sequences in an Online World by Thurner, Stefan et al.
Emergence of Good Conduct, Scaling and Zipf Laws in
Human Behavioral Sequences in an Online World
Stefan Thurner
1,2,3*, Michael Szell
1, Roberta Sinatra
4,5
1Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 2Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States of America, 3IIASA,
Laxenburg, Austria, 4Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia, Universita ` di Catania and INFN, Catania, Italy, 5Laboratory for Complex Systems, Scuola Superiore di Catania,
Catania, Italy
Abstract
We study behavioral action sequences of players in a massive multiplayer online game. In their virtual life players use eight
basic actions which allow them to interact with each other. These actions are communication, trade, establishing or
breaking friendships and enmities, attack, and punishment. We measure the probabilities for these actions conditional on
previous taken and received actions and find a dramatic increase of negative behavior immediately after receiving negative
actions. Similarly, positive behavior is intensified by receiving positive actions. We observe a tendency towards anti-
persistence in communication sequences. Classifying actions as positive (good) and negative (bad) allows us to define
binary ‘world lines’ of lives of individuals. Positive and negative actions are persistent and occur in clusters, indicated by
large scaling exponents a*0:87 of the mean square displacement of the world lines. For all eight action types we find
strong signs for high levels of repetitiveness, especially for negative actions. We partition behavioral sequences into
segments of length n (behavioral ‘words’ and ‘motifs’) and study their statistical properties. We find two approximate power
laws in the word ranking distribution, one with an exponent of k*{1 for the ranks up to 100, and another with a lower
exponent for higher ranks. The Shannon n-tuple redundancy yields large values and increases in terms of word length,
further underscoring the non-trivial statistical properties of behavioral sequences. On the collective, societal level the
timeseries of particular actions per day can be understood by a simple mean-reverting log-normal model.
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Introduction
Societies can be seen as individuals interacting through a
multiplex network (MPN), i.e. a superposition of several social
networks defined on the same set of nodes (individuals) [1,2].
Different types of networks correspond to different types of social
interactions. For example the communication sub-network of the
MPN is the network whose links correspond to the exchange of
information by means of emails, telephone calls, or letters.
Another subnetwork is the trading network, where goods or
services are exchanged between individuals, in exchange for other
goods, money, or –rarely– for nothing. Each of these interactions
usually needs an initial action taken by one of the subjects
involved in the exchange, the sender, and a target to receive it, the
recipient. Actions can (but do not have to) be reciprocated, so that
in general the MPN consists of a set of directed and weighted
subnetworks. The MPN is a highly non-trivial dynamical object.
The different social networks within the MPN are not
independent but strongly influence each other through a
network-network interaction. To understand systemic properties of
societies it is essential to detect and quantify the organizational
principles behind such mutual influences. The MPN is an
example of a co-evolving structure: on one hand the actions of
individuals shape and define the topological structure of the
MPN. On the other hand the topology of the MPN constrains
and influences the possible actions which take place on the MPN.
In general the MPN of a society can not be observed due to
immense requirements on synchronized data acquisition. Despite
these difficulties, the analysis of small-scale MPNs has a tradition in
the social sciences [1,3–5]. Concerning large-scale studies,
recently there have been significant achievements in understand-
ing a number of massive social networks on a quantitative basis,
such as the cell phone communication network [6–8], features of
the world-trade network [9,10], email networks [11], the network
of financial debt [12] and the network of financial flows [13]. The
integration of various dynamical networks of an entire society has
so-far been beyond the scope of any realistic data source.
However with the increasing availability of vast amounts of
electronic fingerprints people leave throughout their lifes, this
situation is about to change. Online sources are capturing more
and more aspects of life, boosting our understanding of collective
human behavior [14,15]. One particular source where complete
behavioral multiplex data is available on the society level are
massive multiplayer online games (MMOGs). In MMOGs
hundreds of thousands of players meet online in a ‘virtual life’
where their actions can be easily studied [16]. Players have to
gain their living through economic activity and usually are
integrated in several types of social networks. In such games
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e29796communication networks, friendship and enmity networks have
been studied, initially as separated entities [17,18]. In [2] trading,
aggression and punishment networks have been added to the
analysis and first measurements on mutual network-network
influences were reported.
In this paper we do not focus on the full MPN but on the
dynamics (actions) taking place on its nodes. We report on the
nature of sequences of human behavioral actions in a virtual
universe of a MMOG. There sequential behavioral data is
available on the scale of an entire society, which is in general
impossible to obtain. The unique data of the online game Pardus
[19] allows to unambiguously track all actions of all players over
long time periods. We focus on the stream of eight types of actions
which are translated into an 8-letter alphabet. This code of actions
of individual players is then analyzed by means of standard
timeseries approaches as have been used, for example, in DNA
sequence analyzes [20–22].
Materials and Methods
The game
The dataset contains practically all actions of all players of the
MMOG Pardus since the game went online in 2004 [19]. Pardus
is an open-ended online game with a worldwide player base of
currently more than 370,000 people. Players live in a virtual,
futuristic universe in which they interact with others in a
multitude of ways to achieve their self-posed goals [23]. Most
players engage in various economic activities typically with the
(self-posed) goal to accumulate wealth and status. Social and
economical decisions of players are often strongly influenced and
driven by social factors such as friendship, cooperation, and
conflict. Conflictual relations may result in aggressive acts such as
attacks, fights, punishment, or even destruction of another
player’s means of production or transportation. The dataset
contains longitudinal and relational data allowing for a complete
and dynamical mapping of multiplex relations of the entire
virtual society, over 1238 days. The behavioral data are free of
‘interviewer-bias’ or laboratory effects since users are not
reminded of their actions being logged during playing. The
longitudinal aspect of the data allows for the analysis of
dynamical aspects such as the emergence and evolution of
network structures. It is possible to extract multiple social
relationships between a fixed set of humans [2].
The game Pardus [19] is sectioned into three independent
‘universes’. Here we focus on the ‘Artemis’ universe, in which we
recorded player actions over the first 1,238 consecutive days of the
universe’s existence. Communication between any two players can
take place directly, by using a one-to-one, e-mail-like private
messaging system, or indirectly, by meeting in built-in chat
channels or online forums. For the player action sequences
analyzed we focus on one-to-one interactions between players
only, and discard indirect interactions such as e.g. participation in
chats or forums [24]. Players can express their sympathy (distrust)
toward other players by establishing so-called friendship (enmity)
links. These links are only seen by the player marking another as a
friend (enemy) and the respective recipient of that link. For more
details on the game, see [18,19]. From all sequences of all 34,055
Artemis players who performed or received an action at least once
within 1,238 days, we removed players with a life history of less
than 1000 actions, leading to the set of the most active 1,758
players which are considered throughout this work. All data used
in this study is fully anonymized; the authors have the written
consent to publish from the legal department of the Medical
University of Vienna.
Human behavioral sequences
We consider eight different actions every player can execute at
any time. These are communication (C), trade (T), setting a
friendship link (F), removing an enemy link (forgiving) (X), attack
(A), placing a bounty on another player (punishment) (B),
removing a friendship link (D), and setting an enemy link (E).
While C, T, F and X can be associated with positive (good) actions,
A, B, D and E are hostile or negative (bad) actions. We classify
communication as positive because only a negligible part of
communication takes place between enemies [18]. Segments of
action sequences of three players (146, 199 and 701) are shown in
the first three lines of Fig. 1 (a).
We consider three types of sequences for any particular player.
The first is the stream of N consecutive actions
Ai~fanjn~1,   ,Ng which player i performs during his ‘life’
in the game. The second sequence is the (time-ordered) stream of
actions that player i receives from all the other players in the
game, i.e. all the actions which are directed towards player i: We
denote by Ri~frnjn~1,   ,Mg received-action sequences.
Finally, the third sequence is the time-ordered combination of
player i’s actions and received-actions, which is a chronological
sequence from the elements of Ai and Ri in the order of
occurrence. The combined sequence we denote by Ci; its length is
MzN, see also Fig. 1 (a). The nth element of one of these series is
denoted by Ai(n), Ri(n),o rCi(n). We do not consider the actual
time between two consecutive actions which can range from
milliseconds to weeks, rather we work in ‘action-time’.
If we assign z1 to any positive action C, T, F or X, and {1 to
the negative actions A, B, D and E, we can translate a sequence Ai
into a symbolic binary sequence Ai
bin. From the cumulative sum of
this sequence a ‘world line’ or ‘random walk’ for player i can be
generated, Wi
good-bad(t)~
Pt
n~1 Ai
bin(n), see Fig. 1 (b). Similarly,
we define a binary sequence from the combined sequence Ci,
where we assign z1 to an executed action and {1 to a received-
action. This sequence we call Ci
bin, its cumulative sum,
Wi
act-rec(t)~
Pt
n~1 Ci
bin(n) is the ‘action-receive’ random-walk or
world line. Finally, we denote the number of actions which
Figure 1. Short segment of action sequences of three players,
A146, A199, and A701. (a). Some actions of players 146 and 701 are
directed toward player 199. This results in a sequence of received-
actions for player 199, R199~f   ATTCE    g. The combined se-
quence of actions (originated from - and directed to) player 199, C199,i s
shown in the last line; red letters mark actions from others directed to
player 199. (b) Schematic illustration showing the definition of a binary
walk in ‘good-bad’ action space (good-bad ‘world line’). A positive
action (C, T, F or X) means an upward move, a negative action (A, B, D
and E) is a downward move. Good people have rising world-lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.g001
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the day and Y stands for one of the eight actions.
Results
The number of occurrences of the various actions of all players
over the entire time period is summarized in Tab. 1 (first line).
Communication is the most dominant action, followed by attacks
and trading which are each about an order of magnitude less
frequent. The daily number of all communications, trades and
attacks, NC(d), NT(d) and NA(d) is shown in Fig. 2 (a), (b) and (c),
respectively. These processes are reverting around a mean, RY. All
processes of actions show an approximate Gaussian statistic of its
log-increments, rY(d)~log
NY(d)
NY(d{1)
. The first 4 moments of the
rY series are listed in Tab. 1. The relatively large kurtosis for T
and A results from a few extreme outliers. The distribution of log-
increments for the NC, NT and NA timeseries are shown in Fig. 2
(d). The lines are Gaussians for the respective mean and standard
deviation from Tab. 1. As maybe the simplest mean-reverting
model with approximate log-normal distributions, we propose
NY(d)~NY(d{1)
rYej(d)R
(1{rY)
Y , ð1Þ
where rY is the mean reversion coefficient, j(d) is a realization of
a zero mean Gaussian random number with standard deviation
sY, and RY is the value to which the process NY(t) reverts to. s is
given by the third line in Tab. 1. Note that this is an AR(1) process
(Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in discrete time) in logarithmic
variables.
Transition probabilities
With p(YjZ) we denote the probability that an action of type Y
follows an action of type Z in the behavioral sequence of a player.
Y and Z stand for any of the eight actions, executed or received
(received is indicated by a subscript r). In Fig. 3 (a) the transition
probability matrix pY jZ ðÞ is shown. The y axis of the matrix
indicates the action (or received-action) happening at a time t, the
probabilities for the actions (or received-actions) that immediately
follow are given in the corresponding horizontal place.
This transition matrix specifies to which extent an action or a
received action of a player is influenced by the action that was
done or received at the previous time-step. In fact, if the
behavioral sequences of players had no correlations, i.e. the
probability of an action, received or executed, is independent of
the history of the player’s actions, the transition probability
pY jZ ðÞ simply is pY ðÞ , i.e. to the probability that an action or
received action Y occurs in the sequence is determined by its
relative frequency only. Therefore, deviations of the ratio
pY jZ ðÞ
p(Y)
Figure 2. Timeseries of the daily number of (a) trades, (b)
attacks, (c) communications in the first 1238 days in the game.
Clearly a mean reverting tendency of three processes can be seen. (d)
Simulation of a model timeseries, Eq. (1), with r~0:94. We use the
values from the NC timeseries, R~4000, and standard deviation
s~0:12. Compare with the actual NC in (c). The free parameter in the
model is r. Parameters are from Tab. 1. Mean reversion and log-
normality motivate the model presented in Eq. (1). (e) The distributions
of log-increments rY of the processes and the model. All follow
approximate Gaussian distribution functions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.g002
Table 1. First row: total number of actions by all players (with at least 1000 actions) in the Artemis universe of the Pardus game.
DB A EFC T X
P1238
d~1 NY(d) 26,471 9,914 558,905 64,444 82,941 5,607,060 393,250 20,165
mean 0.002 0.001 0.004 20.002 20.002 0.000 0.003 0.002
std 1.13 0.79 0.54 0.64 0.35 0.12 0.28 0.94
skew 0.12 0.26 0.35 0.08 0.23 0.11 1.00 20.01
kurtosis 3.35 3.84 6.23 3.67 3.41 3.76 13.89 3.72
Further rows: first 4 moments of rY(d), the distribution of the log-increments of the NY processes (see text). Approximate log-normality is indicated. The large values of
kurtosis for T and A result from a few extreme outliers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.t001
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the values of
pY jZ ðÞ
p(Y)
for actions and received actions (received
actions are indicated with the subscript r) classified only according
to their positive (+) or negative (2) connotation. In brackets we
report the Z-score with respect to the uncorrelated case. We find
that the probability to perform a good action is significantly higher
if at the previous time-step a positive action has been received.
Similarly, it is more likely that a player is the target of a positive
action if at the previous time-step he executed a positive action.
Conversely, it is highly unlikely that after a good action, executed
or received, a player acts negatively or is the target of a negative
action. Instead, in the case a player acts negatively, it is most likely
that he will perform another negative action at the following time-
step, while it is highly improbable that the following action,
executed or received, will be positive. Finally, in the case a
negative action is received, it is likely that another negative action
will be received at the following time-step, while all other possible
actions and received actions are under-represented. The high
statistical significance of the cases P({j{) and P({rj{r) hints
toward a high persistence of negative actions in the players’
behavior, see below.
Another finding is obtained by considering only pairs of
received actions followed by performed actions. This approach
allows to quantify the influence of received actions on the
performed actions of players. For these pairs we measure a
probability of 0:02 of performing a negative action after a received
positive action. This value is significantly lower compared to the
probability of 0:10 obtained for randomly reshuffled sequences.
Similarly, we measure a probability of 0:27 of performing a
negative action after a received negative action. Note that this
result is not in contrast with the values in Fig. 3 (b), since only pairs
made up of received actions and performed actions are taken into
account. Our results agree with a recent study where the
emotional content of posts in online forums was analyzed similarly
[24].
World lines
The world lines Wi
good-bad of good-bad action sequences are
shown in Fig. 4 (a), the action-reaction world lines in Fig. 4 (b). As
a simple measure to characterize these world lines we define the
slope k of the line connecting the origin of the world line to its end
point (last action of the player). A slope of k~1({1) in the good-
bad world lines Wgood-bad indicates that the player performed only
positive (negative) actions. The slope ki is an approximate measure
of ‘altruism’ for player i. The histogram of the slopes for all players
is shown in Fig. 4 (b), separated into good (blue) and bad (red)
players, i.e. players who have performed more good than bad
actions and vice versa. The mean and standard deviation of slopes
of good, bad, and all players are  k kgood~0:81+0:19,
 k kbad~{0:40+0:28, and  k kall~0:76+0:31, respectively. Simulat-
ed random walks with the same probability 0:90 of performing a
positive action yield a much lower variation,  k ksim~0:81+0:01,
pointing at an inherent heterogeneity of human behavior. For the
combined action–received-action world line Wact-rec the slope is a
measure of how well a person is integrated in her social
environment. If k~1 the person only acts and receives no input,
she is ‘isolated’ but dominant. If the slope is k~{1 the person is
driven by the actions of others and does never act nor react. The
histogram of slopes for all players is shown in Fig. 4 (e). Most
players are well within the +45 degree cone. Mean and standard
deviation of slopes of good, bad, and all players are
 k kgood~0:02+0:10,  k kbad~0:30+0:19, and  k kall~0:04+0:12,
respectively. Bad players are tendentially dominant, i.e. they
perform significantly more actions than they receive. Simulated
random walks with equal probabilities for up and down moves for
a sample of the same sequence lengths, we find again a much
narrower distribution with slope  k ksim~0:00+0:01.
As a second measure we use the mean square displacement of
world lines to quantify the persistence of action sequences,
M2(t)~SDW(t){SDW(t)TT
2!t2a, ð2Þ
Figure 3. Transition probabilities pY jZ ðÞ for actions (and
received-actions) Y at a time tz1, given that a specific action
Z was executed or received in the previous time-step t. (a).
Received-actions are indicated by a subscript r. Normalization is such
that rows add up to one. The large values in the diagonal signal that
human actions are highly clustered or repetitive. Large values for C?Cr
and Cr?C reveal that communication is a tendentially anti-persistent
activity – it is more likely to receive a message after one sent a message
and vice versa, than to send or to receive two consecutive messages. (b)
The ratio
pY jZ ðÞ
p(Y)
, shows the influence of an action Z at a previous time-
step t on a following action Y at a time tz1, where Y and Z can be
positive or negative actions, executed or received (received actions are
indicated by the subscript r). In brackets, we report the Z-score
(significance in number of standard deviations) in respect to a sample of
100 randomized versions of the dataset. The cases for which the
transition probability is significantly higher (lower) than expected in
uncorrelated sequences are highlighted in red (green). Receiving a
positive action after performing a positive action is highly over-
represented, and vice versa. Performing (receiving) a negative action
after performing (receiving) another negative one is also highly over-
represented. Performing a negative action has no influence on
receiving a negative action next. All other combinations are strongly
under-represented, for example after performing a negative action it is
very unlikely to perform a positive action with respect to the
uncorrelated case.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.g003
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The asymptotic behavior of M(t) yields information about the
‘persistence’ of a world line. M(t)!t
1
2 is the pure diffusion case,
M(t)!ta with scaling exponent a=
1
2
indicates persistence for
aw
1
2
, and anti-persistence for av
1
2
. Persistence means that the
probability of making an up(down) move at time tz1 is larger(less)
than p~1=2, if the move at time t was an up move. For
calculating the exponents a we use a fit range of t between 5 and
100. We checked from the mean square displacement of single
world lines that this fit range is indeed reasonable.
The histogram of exponents a for the good-bad random walk,
separated into good (blue) and bad (red) players, is shown in Fig. 4
(c), for the action–received-action world line in (f). In the first case
strongly persistent behavior is obvious, in the second there is a
slight tendency towards persistence. Mean and standard deviation
for the good-bad world lines are agood-bad~0:87+0:06, for the
action-received actions aact-rec~0:59+0:10. Simulated sequences
of random walks have – as expected by definition – an exponent of
arnd~0:5, again with a very small standard deviation of about
0:02. Figure 4 (a) also indicates that the lifetime of players who use
negative actions frequently is short. The average lifetime for
players with a slope kv0 is 2528+1856 actions, compared to
players with a slope kw0 with 3909+4559 actions. The average
lifetime of the whole sample of players is 3849+4484 actions.
Motifs, Entropy and Zipf law
By considering all the sequences of actions Ai of all possible
players i, we have an ensemble which allows to perform a motif
analysis [25]. We define a n-string as a subsequence of n
contiguous actions. An n-motif is an n-string which appears in
the sequences with a probability higher than expected, after lower-
order correlations have been properly removed.
Across the entire ensemble, 8n different n-strings can appear,
each of them occurring with a different probability. The
frequency, or observed probability, of each n-string can be
compared to its expected probability of occurrence, which can be
estimated on the basis of the observed probability of lower order
strings, i.e. on the frequency of (n{1)-strings. For example, the
expected probability of occurrence of a 2-string (At,Atz1) is
estimated as the product of the observed probability of the single
actions At and Atz1, pexp(At,Atz1)~pobs(At)pobs(Atz1). Simi-
larly, the probability of a 3-string (At,Atz1,Atz2) to occur can be
estimated as pexp(At,Atz1,Atz2)~pobs(At,Atz1)pobs(Atz2jAtz1),
where pobs(Atz2jAtz1) is the conditional probability to have
action Atz2 following action Atz1. By definition of conditional
probability, one has pobs(Atz2jAtz1)~
pobs(Atz1,Atz2)
pobs(Atz1)
(see [25]
for details). A n-motif in the ensemble is then defined as a n-string
whose observed probability of occurrence is significantly higher
than its expected probability.
We computed the observed and expected probabilities pobs and
pexp for all 82~64 2-strings and for all 83~512 3-strings, focusing
on those n-strings with the highest ratio
pobs
pexp. Higher orders are
statistically not feasible due to combinatorial explosion. We find
that the 2-motifs in the sequences of actions A are clusters of same
letters: BB, DD, XX, EE, FF, AA with ratios
p(obs)
p(exp)
&169, 136,
117, 31, 15, 10, respectively. This observation is consistent with
the previous first-order observation that actions cluster. The most
significant 3-motifs however are (with two exceptions) palin-
Figure 4. World lines of good-bad action random walks of the 1,758 most active players (a), distribution of their slopes k (b), and of
their scaling exponents a (c). By definition, players who perform more good (bad) than bad (good) actions have the endpoints of their world lines
above (below) 0 in (a) and only fall into the kw0 (kv0) category in (b). (d) World lines of action-received random walks, (e) distribution of their slopes
k and (f) of their scaling exponents a. The inset in (d) shows only the world lines of bad players. These players are typically dominant, i.e. they perform
significantly more actions than they receive. In total the players perform many more good than bad actions and are strongly persistent with good as
well as with bad behavior, see (c), i.e. actions of the same type are likely to be repeated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.g004
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p(obs)
p(exp)
&123, 104, 74, 62, 33, 32, respectively. The exceptions
disappear when one considers actions executed on the same screen
in the game as equivalent, i.e. setting or removing friends or
enemies: F, D, E, X. This observation hints towards processes
where single actions of one type tend to disrupt a flow of actions of
another type.
Finally, we partition the action sequences into n-strings
(‘words’). Fig. 5 shows the rank distribution of word occurrences
of different lengths n. The distribution shows an approximate Zipf
law [26] (slope of k~{1) for ranks below 100. For ranks between
100 and 25,000 the scaling exponent approaches a smaller value of
about k*{1:5. The Shannon n-tuple redundancy (see e.g. [20–
22]) for symbol sequences composed of 8 symbols (our action
types) is defined as
R(n)~1z
1
3n
X 8n
i
P
(n)
i log2 P
(n)
i , ð3Þ
where P
(n)
i is the probability of finding a specific n-letter word.
Uncorrelated sequences yield an equi-distribution, Pi~8{n, i.e.
R(n)~0. In the other extreme of only one letter being used,
R(n)~1. In Fig. 5 (inset) R(n) is shown as a function of sequence
length n. Shannon redundancy is not a constant but increases with
n This indicates that Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy might not be an
extensive quantity for action sequences [27].
Discussion
The analysis of human behavioral sequences as recorded in a
massive multiplayer online game shows that communication is by
far the most dominant activity followed by aggression and trade.
Communication events are about an order of magnitude more
frequent than attacks and trading events, showing the importance
of information exchange between humans. It is possible to
understand the collective timeseries of human actions of a
particular type (NY) with a simple mean-reverting log-normal
model. On the individual level we are able to identify
organizational patterns of the emergence of good overall behavior.
Transition rates of actions of individuals show that positive actions
strongly induces positive reactions. Negative behavior on the other
hand has a high tendency of being repeated instead of being
reciprocated, showing the ‘propulsive’ nature of negative actions.
However, if we consider only reactions to negative actions, we find
that negative reactions are highly over-represented. The proba-
bility of acting out negative actions is about 10 times higher if a
person received a negative action at the previous timestep than if
she received a positive action. The action of communication is
found to be of highly reciprocal ‘back-and-forth’ nature. The
analysis of binary timeseries of players (good-bad) shows that the
behavior of almost all players is ‘good’ almost all the time.
Negative actions are balanced to a large extent by good ones.
Players with a high fraction of negative actions tend to have a
significantly shorter life. This may be due to two reasons: First
because they are hunted down by others and give up playing,
second because they are unable to maintain a social life and quit
the game because of loneliness or frustration. We interpret these
findings as empirical evidence for self organization towards
reciprocal, good conduct within a human society. Note that the
game allows bad behavior in the same way as good behavior but
the extent of punishment of bad behavior is freely decided by the
players.
Behavior is highly persistent in terms of good and bad, as seen in
the scaling exponent (a*0:87) of the mean square displacement of
the good-bad world lines. This high persistence means that good
and bad actions are carried out in clusters. Similarly high levels of
persistence were found in a recent study of human behavior [28].
A smaller exponent (a*0:59) is found for the action–received-
action timeseries.
Finally we split behavioral sequences of individuals into
subsequences (of length 1–6) and interpret these as behavioral
‘words’. In the ranking distribution of these words we find a Zipf
law to about ranks of 100. For less frequent words the exponent in
the rank distribution approaches a somewhat smaller exponent of
about k*{1:5. From word occurrence probabilities we further
compute the Shannon n-tuple redundancy which yields relatively
large values when compared for example to those of DNA
sequences [20–22]. This reflects the dominance of communication
over all the other actions. The n-tuple redundancy is clearly not a
constant, reflecting again the non-trivial statistical structure of
behavioral sequences.
Acknowledgments
We thank Werner Bayer for compiling Pardus data.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: ST MS RS. Performed the
experiments: ST MS RS. Analyzed the data: ST MS RS. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: ST MS RS. Wrote the paper: ST.
References
1. Wasserman S, Faust K (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications Cambridge Univ Press.
2. Szell M, Lambiotte R, Thurner S (2010) Multirelational organization of large-scale
social networks in an online world. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107: 13636–13641.
Figure 5. Rank ordered probability distribution of 1 to 6 letter
words. Slopes of k~{1 and k~{1:5 are indicated for reference. The
inset shows the Shannon n-tuple redundancy as a function of word
length n.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029796.g005
Emergence of Good Conduct in Human Behavior
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e297963. McPherson M, Smith-Lovin L, Cook J (2001) Birds of a feather: Homophily in
social networks. Annu Rev of Sociol. pp 415–444.
4. Entwisle B, Faust K, Rindfuss R, Kaneda T (2007) Networks and contexts:
Variation in the structure of social ties. Am J Sociol 112: 1495–1533.
5. Padgett J, Ansell C (1993) Robust action and the rise of the Medici, 1400–1434.
Am J Sociol. pp 1259–1319.
6. Onnela J, Sarama ¨ki J, Hyvo ¨nen J, Szabo ´ G, de Menezes M, et al. (2007) Analysis
of a large-scale weighted network of one-to-one human communication. New J of
Physics 9: 179.
7. Onnela J, Sarama ¨ki J, Hyvo ¨nen J, Szabo ´ G, Lazer D, et al. (2007) Structure and
tie strengths in mobile communication networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 104:
7332.
8. Lambiotte R, Blondel V, de Kerchove C, Huens E, Prieur C, et al. (2008)
Geographical dispersal of mobile communication networks. Physica A 387:
5317–5325.
9. Hidalgo C, Klinger B, Baraba ´si AL, Hausmann R (2007) The product space
conditions the development of nations. Science 317: 482.
10. Hidalgo C, Hausmann R (2009) The building blocks of economic complexity.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106: 10570–10575.
11. Newman M, Forrest S, Balthrop J (2002) Email networks and the spread of
computer viruses. Phys Rev E 66: 035101.
12. Boss M, Elsinger H, Summer M, Thurner S (2004) Network topology of the
interbank market. Quantitative Finance 4: 677–684.
13. Kyriakopoulos F, Thurner S, Puhr C, Schmitz S (2009) Network and eigenvalue
analysis of financial transaction networks. Eur Phys J B 71: 523–531.
14. Lazer D, Pentland A, Adamic L, Aral S, Baraba ´si AL, et al. (2009)
Computational social science. Science 323: 721.
15. Lewis K, Kaufman J, Gonzalez M, Wimmer A, Christakis N (2008) Tastes, ties,
and time: A new social network dataset using Facebook.com. Social Networks
30: 330–342.
16. Bainbridge W (2007) The scientific research potential of virtual worlds. Science
317: 472.
17. Grabowski A, Kruszewska N (2007) Experimental study of the structure of a
social network and human dynamics in a virtual society. Int J of Mod Phys C 18:
1527–1536.
18. Szell M, Thurner S (2010) Measuring social dynamics in a massive multiplayer
online game. Social Networks 32: 313–329.
19. Pardus website. Available at http://www.pardus.at. Accessed 2011 Dec 12.
20. Stanley H, Buldyrev S, Goldberger A, Havlin S, Peng C, et al. (1999) Scaling
features of noncoding DNA. Physica A 273: 1–18.
21. Peng C, Buldyrev S, Goldberger A, Havlin S, Sciortino F, et al. (1992) Long-
range correlations in nucleotide sequences. Nature 356: 168–170.
22. Peng C, Buldyrev S, Havlin S, Simons M, Stanley H, et al. (1994) Mosaic
organization of dna nucleotides. Phys Rev E 49: 1685.
23. Castronova E (2005) Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online
Games. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
24. Chmiel A, Sienkiewicz J, Thelwall M, Paltoglou G, Buckley K, et al. (2011)
Collective emotions online and their inuence on community life. PloS one 6:
e22207.
25. Sinatra R, Condorelli D, Latora V (2010) Networks of motifs from sequences of
symbols. Phys Rev Lett 105: 178702.
26. Zipf G (1949) Human behavior and the principle of least effort. Addison-Wesley.
27. Hanel R, Thurner S (2011) A comprehensive classification of complex statistical
systems and an axiomatic derivation of their entropy and distribution functions.
Eur Phys Lett 93: 20006.
28. Fan C, Guo J, Zha Y (2010) Fractal analysis on human behaviors dynamics.
arXiv. pp 10124088v1.
Emergence of Good Conduct in Human Behavior
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e29796